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Byers: Federal Question Jurisdiction and Indian Tribes: The Second Circu

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND INDIAN TRIBES: THE
SECOND CIRCUIT CLOSES THE COURTHOUSE DOORS IN NEW
YORK V. SHINNECOCKINDIAN NATION
BrandonByers *
I. INTRODUCTION
Most construction projects require permits from the local
municipality. Some require additional permits from the state. The
Westwoods Casino Project in Southampton, New York, the subject of
New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, required no such permits.1 At
least that was what the project's developer, the Shinnecock Indian
Nation (the Shinnecock or the Tribe), thought. Rather than build singlefamily homes on two-acre lots as mandated by the Town of
Southampton's (the Town) zoning code, the Shinnecock envisioned a
130,000 square foot casino with 3,500 gaming devices and 140 table
games; a 3,000 seat theater; 75,000 square feet of retail; five hotels; a
25,000 square foot spa; a 50,000 square foot convention center; a 1,200
to 1,300 seat bingo hall; and a variety of restaurants.2 With 7.2 million
expected visitors per year and a $300 W/U/D (win per unit per day, i.e.,
how much a gaming device wins per day on average), the Shinnecock
certainly believed this development proposal to be more financially
suitable for its land.3 The Town and State of New York (the State),
thought otherwise.
Nestled along the Atlantic Ocean in the south fork of Long Island
approximately eighty miles from New York City, the Town is a popular
seasonal destination. In fact, tourism and the vacation home industry
drive the economic development engine of the community.4 But,
whereas the Shinnecock foresaw millions of new visitors each year with
its project, the Town preferred to keep that number in the thousands. It
is, after all, part of "the Hamptons."
In July 2003, the casino's construction began in earnest with the
Shinnecock's contractor bulldozing trees and clearing brush.
Unfortunately for the Shinnecock, that was about as far as construction
* Associate Member, 2012-2013 University of CincinnatiLaw Review. I give thanks to the
Lord, for He is good and blesses me every day. I also give love to my family, especially my parents,
wife, and son, for their unspoken, daily reminders about the important things in life.
1. New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 701 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2012).
2. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 229-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
3. See id.
4. Demographics,
TowN
OF
SOUTHAMPTON,
N.Y.,
http://www.southamptontownny.gov/content/718/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
5. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
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got before the State's preliminary injunction halted the activities.6 The
State alleged that the planned casino violated New York's antigaming
laws and that the Shinnecock failed to apply for, and receive,
environmental permits.7 The Town joined the legal battle later claimin§
that the Shinnecock failed to receive site plan approval for the casino.
The Shinnecock did not directly dispute any of the allegations. The
Shinnecock knew they had not applied for any permits from the State or
received any approval from the Town. Instead, the Shinnecock
contended that none of this mattered because neither the State nor the
Town had any power under the United States Constitution and federal
common law to require them to obtain any license, permit, or approval
to construct and operate a casino at Westwoods. 9
After removal from state court and spending nearly five years in
litigation, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York ruled against the Shinnecock.1o The Shinnecock pressed on
for another four years only to have the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit hold that the case failed federal question
jurisdiction." Thus, after nine years of discovery, motions, and untold
attorneys' fees, the Shinnecock and the State returned to the place where
it all began, state court-forced to relitigate the same issues and present
the same evidence.
This Casenote analyzes the Second Circuit's decision. Although its
ruling to remand for lack of federal question jurisdiction seemed fairly
straightforward and unremarkable outside the context of Indian law, its
effect could potentially foreclose the ability of Indian tribes to defend
suits in federal court, the venue traditionally thought best able to balance
the competing interests' of states and Indian tribes. Particularly if other
courts adopt the Second Circuit's reasoning, this ruling could adversely
affect Indian tribes' interests across the United States.
Part II of this Casenote will discuss federal question jurisdiction
generally and specifically, its application to Indian tribes. The federal
courts' historical importance in deciding cases involving Indian tribes is
also discussed. Finally, it discusses the opinion of the Second Circuit
and the events leading up to the opinion. Part III analyzes the Second
Circuit's decision in light of the discussion contained in Part II. It
concludes that the Second Circuit betrayed Supreme Court precedent,
failing to give weight to all of the elements of federal question
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Sec New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d I (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
.innecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 191-92.
See id. at 188-90.
See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2012).
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jurisdiction and incorrectly treating the Shinnecock like any other
defendant, which they were not due to the unique congressional and
judicial treatment of Indian tribes throughout this nation's history. Part
IV concludes the Casenote.
II. BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND INDIAN LAW

Federal question jurisdiction precludes suits in federal court which,
absent diversity, raise no federal issues on the face of a plaintiff's wellpleaded complaint. The next Part briefly discusses the elements of
federal question jurisdiction.
A. FederalQuestion Jurisdiction

Since 1875, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 has conferred jurisdiction to federal
district courts over any action "arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."' 2 While this language appears rather
uncontroversial,13 just what type of action "aris[es] under" federal law
continues to be a source of litigation in federal courts. Determining
whether an action meets federal question jurisdiction requires the court
to look first to the face of the plaintiff s well-pleaded complaint.14 If the
federal question appears on the face of plaintiffs "statement of his own
claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in the
anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant
may interpose[,]" the federal question is said to be "well-pleaded." 5
In most cases, resolving whether the plaintiff meets the well-pleaded
complaint rule ends the inquiry because federal question jurisdiction is
"by and large" invoked by a plaintiff pleading a cause of action created

12. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
13. In fact, it closely tracks Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. I of the Constitution ("The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; .).
U.S. CONsT. amend
III, § 2, cl. 1.
14. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) ("[A] suit arises under
the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of
action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution."); See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) ("It is long settled law that a cause of action arises under federal law
only when the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law."); Gully v. First Nat'l
Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936) ("To bring a case within [§ 1331], a right or immunity created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiffs
cause of action. The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws
of the United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another[,] .. . and
the controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the
petition for removal.").
15. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989).
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by federal law.16 Thus, if a federal statute, for example, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, expressly provides that a plaintiff can bring suit against another
party in federal court for a violation of that statute the suit "arises under
the [federal] law that creates the cause of action."' i
Another way for a suit to access the federal courthouse, which the
Supreme Court characterizes as a "special and small category of
cases,"1 occurs when a "state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated
federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum
may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance
of federal and state judicial responsibilities."l 9 When the Grable Court
expressed this "substantial" federal question test, it attempted to
condense years of decisions in order to tame an "unruly doctrine," 20
which instructed "common-sense accommodation of judgment to
kaleidoscopic situations" or "a selective process which picks the
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside." 2 1
Commentators and the Court have remarked that the doctrine appeared
to be painted on a canvas by Jackson Pollock. 22 Regardless of its past
confusion, the Court recently reaffirmed the Grable test in Gunn v.
Minton23 and held that if all four elements are met, the federal court can
properly take the case because "there is a serious federal interest in
claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum."24
B. The Murky World of Regulating Indian Tribes
The Court's statement in Gunn that a federal forum provides certain
advantages over state courts for "serious federal interests" invokes the
"parity" debate. According to some commentators, federal courts are far
16. Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfr., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
17. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
18. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013) (quoting Empire HealthChoice Assurance,
Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)).
19. Grable,545 U.S. at 314.
20. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065.
21. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936).
22. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065; 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562 (3d ed. 2008) (reviewing the general confusion
on the subject). Jackson Pollock was an influential American painter in the Abstract Expressionist
movement. Robert Coates, a critic for the New Yorker, described Pollock's work as "mere unorganized
explosions of random energy, and therefore meaningless." Steven McElroy, IfIt's So Easy, Why Don't
You Try It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at L19. Whether or not that critique is fair to Mr. Pollock depends
on a person's taste in art. But, it certainly is an apt description of the Court's previous conception of
federal question jurisdiction.
23. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065 ("[Flederal jurisdiction over a state-law claim will lie if a federal
issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in
federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.").
24. Id. (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 313).
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better equipped to reach the "correct" decision.25 Whether federal
courts are in fact more sympathetic and more knowledgeable than state
courts on federal issues is arguable. However, in the context of Indian
law, state regulation of Indian tribes, and hence state courts' jurisdiction
to hear cases involving them, have traditionally been minimal.
Cases involving Indian tribes represent a unique and interesting field
of jurisprudence in the United States. Many rights that Indian tribes
possess predate the Constitution,26 which often require courts to
research documents and treaties that are hundreds of years old.27
Although Indian law can be confusing, Felix S. Cohen, in his widelycited treatise, noted some "fundamental principles" that underlie the
field of federal Indian law.28
First, "an Indian nation possesses in the first instance all of the
powers of a sovereign state." 9 The rights vested in a tribe are generally
not delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather
inherent powers of a limited sovereignty, which preexisted the formation
of the United States and continue unless diminished by treaty or statute
from the federal government or, in certain instances, by federal common
law. 30 Second, Congress and the executive branch of the federal
government have both primary and broad responsibility over Indian
affairs. 3 1 Finally, due to this federal responsibility, the states have
limited authority over Indian affairs.32 This latter notion finds support
in early-nineteenth century Supreme Court opinions. 33 Recent state and
25. See, e.g., Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity,90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (arguing that
federal judges are more sympathetic to federal claims because their positions are more prestigious and
better paid, which tend to be filled by more competent lawyers, and they enjoy life tenure, which makes
their decisions more insulated from outside pressures); but see Michael E. Solimine, The Future of
Parity,46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1457, 1469 (2005) (although state courts exhibit no clear reluctance to
uphold federal claims that a federal district court would uphold, the paper offered a "weak parity" thesis:
while state courts afford litigants a constitutionally adequate hearing on federal claims, they are not
interchangeable with federal courts and sometimes provide a "home court advantage" to in-state
defendants).
26. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
27. For example, in Shinnecock, the district court analyzed land patents from as far back as 1635
to determine whether the Shinnecock extinguished its aboriginal title to Westwoods. New York v.
Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
28. CoHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter
COHEN'S HANDBOOK].

29. Id. at 20.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832) ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct
community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress."); In re The
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866).
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federal district court decisions have reaffirmed this principle in certain
circumstances. 34 Thus, unless Congress grants to a state the power to
regulate persons or conduct inside Indian land, federal supremacy leaves
little room for state involvement. 35 In addition to federal statutes,
numerous Supreme Court decisions have framed the states' power to
control the conduct of Indian tribes.
In Rice v. Olson, the Court stated that "[t]he policy of leaving Indians
free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's
history." 36 The Court once described the states as the "deadliest
enemies" of Indian tribes. 3 7 Despite this strong language, an Indian
tribe's power to avoid state regulation of their activities by asserting
tribal sovereign immunity has not remained "static."38 As Indians left
the reservations and assimilated with non-Indians, the Court "modified"
its approach to give states more power over both individual Indians and
Indian tribes "where essential tribal relations were not involved and
where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized." 39 Still, "if the
crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly
conferred on other courts by Congress . .. remained exclusive" and
"absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them.AO In other words, under
this framework, for state action to determine the conduct of Indians
either (1) Congress must expressly abrogate the immunity of certain
tribal conduct, thereby permitting states to exercise jurisdiction, or (2)
the state action must not affect the right of Indians to govern their own
affairs. However, the Court gives less deference to tribal sovereign
immunity outside the reservation context. For example, in Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. United States, the Court distinguished between
reservation Indians and Indians that held land "in fee, not in trust."41 In
that case, those Indians that held land "in fee" were not entitled to

34. See, e.g., Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Naftaly, 452 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2006) (state may
not tax tribal real property owned in fee within exterior boundaries of reservation); Shivwits Band of
Paiute Indians v. Utah, 428 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2005) (state may not enforce its billboard regulations on
trust land within Indian country); Winer v. Penny Enters., Inc., 674 N.W.2d 9 (N.D. 2004) (state court
lacks jurisdiction to hear tort claim by non-Indian against Indian for accident arising on state highway
within reservation); South Dakota v. Cummings, 679 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 2004) (state police officers may
not pursue fleeing tribal members onto reservation).
35. CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 20.
36. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945).
37. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
38. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
39. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
40. Id. at 219-20.
41. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 603-04 (1943).
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"effective tribal immunity."42
Despite the lessening effectiveness of tribal sovereign immunity, it is
relevant "not because it provides a definitive resolution of the
issues ... but because it provides a backdrop against which [] applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read." Thus, although Indians are
United States citizens, eligible to vote and use state courts, they are still
relatively independent. The Court further stated in McClanahanv. State
Tax Commission ofArizona:

The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United
States . . . [is] an anomalous one and of a complex character.... They
were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent
position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as
nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the
State within whose limits they resided.44
While much has changed since early Supreme Court decisions where
Indian tribes lived autonomously on their land, they are still regarded as
"semi-independent." While the states and Indian tribes today may not
be "deadliest enemies" of long-ago lore, "federal treaties and statutes
[still] define the boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction.A5
C. FederalQuestion JurisdictionandIndian Tribes

Although federal law and treaties often regulate the activities of
Indian tribes, federal jurisdiction is not inevitable. Given that federal
courts are "courts of limited jurisdiction"46 and "possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute,"A7 any case involving an Indian
tribe still must meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Since Grable was decided in 2005, the Supreme Court has yet to
decide how that test applies to a dispute involving an Indian tribe. 48
Certain statutes expressly provide a cause of action when litigation
involves Indian tribes, but no statute or constitutional provision

42. Id.
43. McClanahan,411 U.S. at 172.
44. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
45. McClanahan,411 U.S. at 172 n.8.
46. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005).
47. Id.
48. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2206
(2012). Although this case involved an Indian tribe and the Court cited Grable, it was not cited for
jurisdictional purposes.
49. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 50 (1996).
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outlines any general scheme for Indian tribes' disputes.50 In addition,
lower federal courts have ruled that Indian tribes are not citizens of any
state for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.51 Thus, federal
jurisdiction is not automatic simply because the suit implicates an Indian
tribe, it involves tribal-owned property, or it arises in Indian country. 52
However, the Court has found that an Indian tribe's present-day
possessory interest in its aboriginal lands presents a federal question. In
Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, New York, the
Supreme Court held that a claim between an Indian tribe and various
counties regarding the right of possession of real property met federal
question jurisdiction even though it was essentially a state-law cause of
action.5 3
In Oneida, the Indian tribe brought suit to recover damages from the
unlawful possession of land it previously owned and occupied "from
time immemorial[.]" 54 In the 1780s and 1790s, the Indian tribe entered
into various treaties with the United States confirming the Indian tribe's
right to possession of some six million acres of land in New York until,
and if, the United States decided to purchase it. 5 The complaint alleged
that the federal Nonintercourse Act,56 which was passed in 1790,
forbade the conveyance of any land without the permission of the
United States. 57 In 1788, the Indian tribe ceded five million acres to the
State of New York, with 300,000 acres withheld for a reservation. 58 In
1795, the Indian tribe further conveyed a portion of these reserved lands

50. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 28, § 7.04.
51. Id.; see, e.g., Am. Vantage Cos., Inc. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th
Cir. 2002); Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 27 (1st
Cir. 2000); Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997); Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F.3d 726,
729 (10th Cir. 1993).
52. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 7.04; see, e.g., T.P. Johnson Holdings, LLC v.
Poarch Band Of Creek Indians, No. 3:09-CV-305-WKW [WO], 2009 WL 2983201 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 17,
2009) (rejecting the contention that simply because an Indian tribe was a defendant, then federal subject
matter jurisdiction was satisfied); compare Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Native Wholesale Supply Co., 632 F.
Supp. 2d 988 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (In a suit alleging that a tribal cigarette importer sold cigarettes to tribal
smoke shops, which then unlawfully sold those cigarettes to non-Indians in violation of state law, the
court rejected the tribe's contention that tribal sovereign immunity necessarily supports federal subject
matter jurisdiction.), with Penobscot Nation v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 254 F.3d 317, 322 (1st Cir. 2001)
(noting that "[e]specially in Indian cases, the Supreme Court has sometimes found federal rights
present-or at least arguably present-out of a tradition of federal regulation in the area").
53. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y., 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
54. Id. at 664.
55. Id.
56. 1 Stat. 137, 138 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177) (1790) ("[N]o sale of lands made by any
Indians ... within the United States, shall be valid to any person... to any state... unless the same
shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States.").
57. Oneida,414 U.S. at 664.
58. Id.
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to the state, allegedly without the consent of the United States. 59 The
Indian tribe argued that this 1795 cessation was ineffective due to the
federal treaties and Nonintercourse Act. 60
The district court ruled that the suit failed federal question jurisdiction
because the cause of action was created under state law as involving
only allegations of the Indian tribe's possessory interest in the land and
the counties' interference with it.61 Further, the necessity of interpreting
federal treaties and the Nonintercourse Act was simply a potential
defense.62 The Second Circuit affirmed, ruling that "the jurisdictional
claim shatters on the rock of the well-pleaded complaint rule[.]" 63 The
Second Circuit reiterated that although any decision necessarily required
deciding whether the 1795 cessation complied with the federal
Nonintercourse Act, "this alone did not establish 'arising under'
jurisdiction[.]"64 Instead, the Second Circuit read the complaint simply
as a state-law action based on the current right to possession of real
property.6 5
The Supreme Court assumed that the case was "essentially a
possessory action," but reversed the lower courts' decisions because the
complaint asserted "a current right to possession conferred by federal
law, wholly independent of state law."
The Court found it not "so
insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or
otherwise completely devoid of merit as to involve a federal controversy
within the jurisdiction of the District Court[.]"67 The Court stressed that
"[g]iven the nature and source of the possessory rights of Indian tribes to
their aboriginal lands ... it is plain that the complaint asserted a
controversy arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States[.]" 68
The Court noted that its precedent had held that only the United
States could interfere with or determine an Indian tribe's right of
occupancy.69 Federal law protected tribal rights, and, regarding Indian
59. Id.
60. Id. at 664-65.
61. Id. at 665.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 666.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 667.
69. Id. at 667-68; see, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 586 (1823) ("The exclusive right
of the United States to extinguish [an Indian tribe's] title, and to grant the soil, has never, we believe,
been doubted."); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 540 (1832); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 244
(1872); Butz v. N. Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55, 66 (1886); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 227
(1923); United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyo., 304 U.S. 111,

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

9

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 6

910

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

title based on aboriginal possession, the "power of Congress . .. [was]

supreme." 70 Thus, the Court declared, "Indian title is a matter of federal
law." 7 1
Finally, the Court recognized the tension between state law and
federal law by noting that states often have denied "the notion that
federal law and federal courts must be deemed the controlling
considerations in dealing with Indians." 72 Despite this tension and "the
obvious fact" that New York had dealt legitimately with Indian tribes
antedating the Constitution and "continued to play a substantial role"
today, the Court nonetheless stated that "this only underlines the legal
reality that the controversy alleged ... may well depend on what the
reach and impact of the federal law will prove to be in this case." 73
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion noted that federal courts
traditionally were "inhospitable forums" for plaintiffs asserting
possessory land claims. 7 4 However, due to the federal government's
"continuing solicitude for the rights of the Indians in their land," this
was not a "garden-variety ejectment claim."7 5
Finally, while the Supreme Court has yet to directly discuss Grable's
applicability to an Indian tribe, other federal courts have.76 In a case
with similar facts to Shinnecock Indian Nation, the Sixth Circuit found
federal question jurisdiction in a suit that turned on whether a casino
was located on Indian land. The court stated:
Specifically, each claim on its face presents a question of federal law

(whether the Vanderbilt casino is located on Indian lands) that is disputed
by the parties. That question could have a substantial impact on both the
present litigation and on federal Indian-gaming law more generally. And
there is no reason to think Congress would prefer this question to be
resolved by state courts. To the contrary, Indian law is primarily the
115-16 (1938); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1941).
70. Oneida,414 U.S. at 669 (quoting SantaFe Pac.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 347).
71. Id at 670.
72. Id at 678.
73. Id at 678-79.
74. Id at 683 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
75. Id at 684 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
76. Md. Comm'r of Fin. Regulation v. W. Sky Fin., LLC, No. WDQ-11-0735, 2011 WL
4894075, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 12, 2011) (In alleged violations of consumer loan laws, the court found that
it lacked federal question jurisdiction even though the Indian tribe raised the defense of sovereign
immunity because the defense was not an "essential element" of the claim.); Muhammad v. Comanche
Nation Casino, 742 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1277 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (In a slip-and-fall state law tort claim
against an Indian-owned casino, the court found that it had federal question jurisdiction "'given the
absence of threatening structural consequences' and the importance for availability for a federal forum,
'there is no good reason to shirk from federal jurisdiction over the dispositive and contested federal
issue at the heart of this state-law . .. claim."') (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g
& Mfr., 545 U.S. 308, 319-20 (2005)).
77. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406, 413 (6th Cir. 2012).
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province of the federal courts. So federal jurisdiction does exist for these
claims[.] 8
To summarize the discussion thus far, as a threshold matter, suits
involving Indian tribes must satisfy the "arising under" language of 28
U.S.C. § 1331. This includes the "well-pleaded" complaint rule and
presumably, the Grable framework. However, Supreme Court decisions
clearly indicate that Indian tribes are somewhat different than the typical
plaintiff or defendant. Due to Indian tribes' "semi-independent"
character, limited sovereignty, and the federal government's broad
power over their rights and activities, federal courts traditionally
entertain cases involving them. Although state courts are frequently
more involved in resolving disputes concerning Indian tribes than they
had been in the past, under Oneida, at least, an Indian tribe's current
possessory interest in its aboriginal land invokes federal question
jurisdiction.
D. The State and the Tribe Go to Court
After the Shinnecock planned to commence tree clearing on the
Westwoods site, the State brought suit in state court.79 The Tribe filed a
motion pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1441 seeking to remove the action to
federal court.8 1 The district court granted the motion and held that the
complaint "explicitly plead[ed] a federal question" because (1) it
"raise[d] questions relating to the possessory rights of Indian tribes in
tribal lands that [we]re federal in nature and subject to complete federal
preemption," and (2) "[a]ll the causes of action necessarily require[d]
the resolutions of questions of federal law." 82
78. Id. (finding its jurisdiction under the Indian tribe's assertion of tribal sovereign immunity).
79. New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (E.D.N.Y 2003).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.").
81. New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 274 F. Supp. 2d 268, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Shortly
before the district court's decision regarding the Tribe's § 1441 motion, the Town filed its separate suit.
The Tribe also made a motion to remove this action to federal court. The district court then
consolidated the actions after making its decision on the Tribe's motion to remove. New York v.
Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
82. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 269-71. On its face, the Complaint alleges
five causes of action. In the first cause of action, the plaintiffs allege, in conclusion:
77. Therefore, defendants [sic] planned actions to build a casino and conduct gaming cannot be
authorized by IGRA [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701-2721] and,
therefore, are in violation the federal statute [sic].
In their Declaratory Judgment portion of the Complaint, the plaintiffs allege in part:
i. the defendants are not a federally-recognized Tribe;
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At trial, the Shinnecock raised a number of defenses. They first
argued they held unextinguished aboriginal title to the Westwoods
parcel. They further argued that as a "sovereign tribe of Indians" they
"[could not] be sued absent consent or waiver, which it did not give" in
the present action.84 Either one of these defenses, if proved, would have
precluded the State from enforcing its antigaming laws and other permit
requirements on the Shinnecock. However, the court, after conducting a
thirty-day bench trial, which included over twenty witnesses, over 600
exhibits, and over 4,000 pages of transcripts, rejected each argument.8 5
The court also considered the applicability of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act86 (IGRA) on the Shinnecock's activities at Westwoods.
Following the Supreme Court decision in Californiav. Cabazon Band of

Mission Indians, which limited the power of states to apply their gaming
laws on Indian lands,87 Congress enacted IGRA in 1988. IGRA sought
to provide a "comprehensive regulatory framework for gaming activities
on Indian lands ... [in order] to balance the interests of tribal
governments, the states, and the federal government."88 Two important

provisions of IGRA are relevant in Shinnecock Indian Nation.

First, IGRA provides that "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to
regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not
specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State
j.

the defendants' property which is the subject of this action, the gaming site, does not constitute
"Indian lands" as that term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and in, 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq. (IGRA);
k. the defendants lack sovereign immunity with respect to the operation of the state gambling
laws at the gambling site; . . .
n. the defendants lack sovereign immunity to the operation of state and federal environmental
laws at the gambling site;
o. the defendants cannot build a casino or any other structure for the purpose of gaming at the
gambling site unless they first comply with Town, state, and federal and environmental laws;
p. the defendants may not begin building any kind of structure on the gaming site without first
giving the plaintiffs 120 days notice prior to the beginning of such construction unless and until
they fully comply with all Town, state and federal laws and regulations governing the building
of structures on the gaming site;
q. the defendants may not operate a bingo hall or other gambling establishment without first
giving the plaintiffs 120 days notice prior to the opening of the establishment unless and until
they fully comply with the provisions of the Bingo Licensing Law, the Bingo Control Law, the
Games of Chance Licensing Law or the provisions of the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
83. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
84. Id. at 297.
85. Id. at 302.
86. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2012).
87. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214 (1987).
88. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1548 (10th Cir. 1997); see Am. Greyhound
Racing Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Congress declared [in 25. U.S.C. § 2702(1)]
that IGRA's primary purpose was to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian
tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments.").
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which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit
such gaming activity." 89 Although this provision seems overly
deferential to Indian tribes, the statute itself sets limits and depending on
the proposed casino activities, both the federal Indian Gaming
Commission and the state must approve the casino plan.90 But, if the
Indian tribe and its gaming activity follow IGRA's requirements, this
federal law necessarily preempts state law.9 1
Second, before IGRA can apply to an Indian tribe's gaming proposal,
the Indian tribe must meet two substantive requirements. First, the
Indian tribe must be, in fact, an "Indian tribe" as defined under IGRA,
which generally includes only tribes recognized by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. 2 Second, gaming under IGRA can only occur on lands the
federal government defines as "Indian lands," which include both
reservation lands and land held in trust by the United States.93 Thus, if
an Indian tribe fails one of these elements, state law determines the
procedures and requirements needed to permit, construct, and operate a
-94
casino.
89. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2012).
90. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). For example, for "Class III gaming activities," which generally
includes the most intrusive gaming activities and is the subject of the litigation between the Shinnecock
Indian Nation and the State of New York, the particular state and Indian tribe must enter into a "TribalState compact" before the Indian Gaming Commission will permit the gaming activity. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d) regarding the particulars of the "Tribal-State compact," and 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) for the
definition of "Class III gaming."
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(c) (2012) ("For the purpose of this section, the term "gambling" does not
include(1) class I gaming or class II gaming regulated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or
(2) class III gaming conducted under a Tribal-State compact approved by the Secretary of the
Interior under section I1(d)(8) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that is in effect.");
see also, Carruthers v. Flaum, 365 F. Supp. 2d 448, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("IGRA preempts state antigaming laws, but only to the extent of its application."); Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Vill. of Union
Springs, 317 F. Supp. 2d 128, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) ("IGRA ... preempts state and local attempts to
regulate gaming on Indian lands.").
92. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(5) (2012). "The term 'Indian tribe' means any Indian tribe, band, nation,
or other organized group or community of Indians which(A) is recognized as eligible by the Secretary for the special programs and services provided by
the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians, and (B) is recognized as
possessing powers of self-government."
Id.
93. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4). "The term 'Indian lands' means(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and (B) any lands title to which is either
held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any
Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over
which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power."
Id.
94. See e.g., Carruthers, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 466; First Am. Casino Corp. v. E. Pequot Nation,
175 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209-10 (D. Conn. 2000) ("Because IGRA's text unambiguously limits its scope to
gaming by tribes that have attained federal recognition, the statute does not apply to defendant's
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In this case, the district court determined that the Shinnecock met
neither prerequisite under IGRA. First, since the Bureau of Indian
Affairs did not recognize the Shinnecock under federal law, the district
court found that it could not meet the definition of "Indian tribe."
Further, since the Shinnecock held the land "in fee," and was thus
neither reservation land nor land held in trust by the United States, the
Westwoods's parcel failed the "Indian lands" prong.
E. The Shinnecock Appeal to the Second Circuit
Following the district court's issuance of a permanent injunction
against the Shinnecock's activities at Westwoods, the Shinnecock
appealed to the Second Circuit challenging the district court's legal and
factual conclusions and arguing that the federal government's
recognition of the Tribe after the district court's decision mooted the
permanent injunction. 95 However, the Second Circuit held that the
district court lacked jurisdiction and declined to reach the merits of the
appeal. 96 Thus, the Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded
with instructions for the district court to remand the case back to state
court.97
Judge John M. Walker, Jr., writing for the three-judge panel, first held
that the State's complaint alleged violations of only state and local law
and, therefore, did not state a federal cause of action.98 Although the
State referenced federal law in its complaint, those references "only
anticipate[d] and refute[d] the Shinnecock's defenses." 99 Thus,
according to the Second Circuit, the complaint was not "well-pleaded."
Regarding the well-pleaded complaint rule's applicability to Indian
tribes, the court quoted Oklahoma Tax Commission for support that
"although tribal immunity may provide a federal defense to [the State's]
claims, . . . it has long been settled that the existence of a federal
immunity to the claims asserted does not convert a suit otherwise arising
under state law into one which, in the statutory sense, arises under
gaming-related activities . ... Accordingly, plaintiff's state law claims are not completely preempted by
IGRA.").
95. New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2012). Regarding the
federal recognition of the Tribe, the Department of Interior issued a Final Determination "extend[ing]
Federal Acknowledgment ... to the Shinnecock Indian Nation," which entitled it to be placed on the list
of federally recognized Indian tribes maintained by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and thus qualifying the
Tribe as an "Indian tribe" under IGRA. Brief of Defendant-Appellant the Shinnecock Indian Nation and
All Other Defendants-Appellants at 9, New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133 (2d Cir.
2012) (No. 08-1194-cv), 2010 WL 8759130, at *9.
96. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d at 135.
97. Id. at 142.
98. Id. at 138-39.
99. Id. at 138.
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federal law."100
The court next addressed whether Grable provided federal question
jurisdiction because the "right to relief depend[ed] on the resolution of
substantial questions of federal law."' 0 In this case, resolution of the
applicability of either IGRA or the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
conferred by aboriginal title raised the alleged "substantial question of
federal law." Although the Second Circuit acknowledged that this was
"essentially the only issue in dispute at trial" and, in order to prevail on
its claims, the State needed to prove that no federal Indian law precluded
application of state and local law, it held that those federal issues were
insufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction.102
The Second Circuit found that the claims asserted did not "necessarily
raise"1 03 a federal issue because whether the construction of the casino
violated state and local law was a "distinct" issue from whether a federal
defense such as tribal sovereign immunity precluded the State and Town
from regulating the Shinnecock's activities at Westwoods.104 To
illustrate its point, the court noted that if the Shinnecock had in fact
complied with state and local law, a "court could have resolved the case
without reaching the federal issues."10 5 In other words, unlike
Grable,106 where the plaintiff "had no content other than the federal law
issue on which it was based," the claims here "could [have] be[en]
decided without reference to federal law." 0 7 Although the federal
issues in the case were necessary to the resolution of the State's claims,
the Second Circuit stated that this was irrelevant to the jurisdictional
question because "[c]omplete defenses, by definition, always must be
decided before a claim can be resolved." 08
Finally, the court rejected the Shinnecock's assertion that federal
question jurisdiction could be premised under Oneida. It seized on
language in Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion that Oneida was not
100. Id. at 139 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989)).
101. Id
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfr., 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005)).
104. Id. at 140.
105. Id.
106. In Grable, the plaintiff brought a state-law claim asserting superior title to certain real
property the IRS had seized and sold to the defendant in order to satisfy the plaintiff's federal tax
liability. Grable, 545 U.S. at 310-11. The defendant removed the case to federal court on the basis that
the plaintiff's state law quiet title claim depended on the interpretation of federal tax law's notice
requirements. Id. The district court denied the plaintiffs motion to remand and ruled in favor of the
defendant on the merits. Id. The court of appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the jurisdictional issue. Id.
107. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d at 141 n.5.
108. Id.
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a case that "dependled] for its federal character solely on possible
federal defenses[.]"
Whereas in Oneida "the right to possession itself
[was] claimed to arise under federal law in the first instance," 10 i.e., the
Indian tribe brought the claim, in this case, according to the Second
Circuit, the "federal issues related to Indian land arise defensively.""'
Judge Peter W. Hall wrote a strong dissent,112 which argued, in
essence, that while the federal issues could be used as defenses by the
Shinnecock, if the State wanted to regulate the Tribe's activities at all,
resolution of those federal issues must be answered before determining
whether the Tribe violated state and local law. The dissent agreed with
the majority that determining whether tribal sovereign immunity barred
the State's action was not the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 113
Instead, it existed because the State had to prove that Westwoods was
not "Indian land" as defined in IGRAll 4 and 18 U.S.C. § 1151,115 which
included aboriginal title as "Indian country."ll6 Addressing the "wellpleaded complaint" rule, the dissent argued that the State affirmatively
pleaded that the Shinnecock occupied and held Westwoods "in fee," and
that it would "prove, in order7 to prevail on its claims, that Westwoods
[was] not 'Indian Country."'ll
The dissent found the Grable test met because whether the
109. Id. at 141 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 682-83 (1974)).
110. Id. (quoting Oneida, 414 U.S. at 675).
111. Id
112. "By focusing on the tribe's defenses instead of the complaint, the majority,
inadvertently . .. ensures that every state or local enforcement action brought against an Indian tribe
alleged to be occupying non-'Indian land,' whether commenced initially in federal court or commenced
in state court and removed to federal court, will be dismissed for want of federal subject matter
jurisdiction." Id at 142 (Hall, J., dissenting). Thus, according to Judge Hall, tribes within the
jurisdiction of the Second Circuit "will no longer have the option of a federal forum to resolve those
disputes regarding aboriginal title[.]" Id. at 143 (Hall, J., dissenting). This result "flies in the face of
over 200 years of federal Indian law jurisprudence, which has evolved in large part to address and
accommodate the historically thorny nature of tribal-state relations and a fear of 'home-cooking' in state
courts, particularly as to issues involving the assertion of state jurisdiction over Indian tribes." Id (Hall,
J., dissenting).
113. The dissent argued that the majority "misconstrue[d] the tribe's defense of sovereign
immunity as the pertinent federal issue purporting to give rise to federal question jurisdiction." Id. at
143 (Hall, J., dissenting).
114. Supra note 93.
115. "Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term 'Indian
country', as used in this chapter, means . .. (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same."
116. The majority addressed this argument in a footnote stating that it "failed to perceive a
difference between the plaintiffs' right to bring an action enforcing state and local law at Westwoods,
and the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit and local regulation of activities at Westwoods" because
"the question whether plaintiffs can bring this action is simply a restatement of the question whether the
Tribe is immune from suit and from state and local regulation." Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d at
141 n.4.
117. Id. at 143 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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Shinnecock held aboriginal title to Westwoods was an "essential
element" of the State's claim.
In other words, "only by pleading that
the tribe does not hold aboriginal title to Westwoods[,] an issue of
federal law that is actually in dispute by virtue of the tribe's presuit
ownership and occupation of Westwoods as if the tribe does hold Indian
title[,] can the state plead facially viable claims in the present case."119
Thus, unless the State could prove its case under federal law, the State's
authority to regulate the Shinnecock's casino activities was "a dead
letter."12

Although the majority did not consider it "part of the jurisdictional
calculus" of Grable,121 the dissent found the "important and historic
interest"l22 in providing Indian tribes with a federal forum to adjudicate
their land disputes with states as one that "sensibly belongs in federal
court."l23 It found little risk that recognizing federal jurisdiction over
the case would "open the floodgates for cases" involving tribal and state
casino permitting disputes. 124
Finally, regarding Oneida, whereas the majority found it supporting
the argument that issues of federal Indian law cannot "disturb the wellpleaded complaint rule,"'125 the dissent read it for the proposition that
"possessory rights of Indian tribes to their aboriginal lands" necessarily
"arise under" federal law.1 26
III. DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DISREGARD FOR THE RIGHTS
OF INDIAN TRIBES

The importance of Shinnecock Indian Nation depends not on the

merits of the Shinnecock's right to build a casino. Its importance relates
to the apparent foreclosing of the federal forum for all Indian tribes to
defend against state enforcement actions altering the rights of their
allegedly aboriginal title. Given that Supreme Court precedent indicates

118.

Id. at 145-46 (Hall, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 146 (Hall, J., dissenting). To put it another way in Grable terms, the dissent states that
"[b]ecause the tribe owns and occupies Westwoods, making it prima facie Indian land, the plaintiffs'
right to relief-regulation of activities at Westwoods-necessarily depends on the resolution of a
substantial question of federal law-is Westwoods 'Indian land' within the meaning of 25 U.S.C.
§ 2703(4) and 18 U.S.C. § 1151." Id at 144 (Hall, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 141 n.6.
122. Id. at 146-47 (Hall, J., dissenting).
123. Id at 146 (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g &
Mfr., 545 U.S. 308, 315 (2005)).
124. Id. at 147 (Hall, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 141 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 676 (1974)).
126. Id at 142 (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting Oneida,414 U.S. at 667).
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that "Indian title is a matter of federal law,"l 27 it seems curious that the
Second Circuit found absolutely no basis for federal question
jurisdiction. Despite its concern with federal "defenses" implicating the
well-pleaded complaint rule, on balance, the Second Circuit erroneously
applied Grable and failed to give proper deference to Oneida.
A. The Well-Pleaded ComplaintRule
The majority opinion held that the complaint alleged violations of
state and local law, and any reference to federal law asserted only that it
would not immunize the Shinnecock's conduct. 128
Initially, to assess whether a complaint alleges a violation of federal
law "on its face," a court must look to the complaint itself.129 The
majority cited only two out of the seventy-seven total allegations, in just
the first cause of action alone, to hold that the references to federal law
arose only as a possible defense to the State's allegations.1 30 Although
these two allegations could, perhaps, be read to "anticipate" a federal
defense, the State also expressly alleged that the Shinnecock's conduct
violated federal statutes. 13 In addition, the State further alleged that the
Shinnecock were not a federally-recognized tribe, the Westwoods parcel
was not "Indian lands" under federal law, the Shinnecock lacked
sovereign immunity, and the Shinnecock could not begin construction of
the casino without first complying with IGRA, a federal law.1 32
While these allegations were, of course, defenses to the State's
enforcement action, the State must also prove them in order to prevail
on its claims. The majority opinion sidestepped the fact that the State's
127. Oneida, 414 U.S. at 670.
128. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d at 138.
129. Supra note 14.
130. Shinnecock IndianNation, 686 F.3d at 138-39.
74. Because federal recognition of a tribe of Indians is a condition precedent under [the] IGRA
for any tribe of Indians in New York State to conduct certain gaming activities which would
otherwise be in violation of State law, and because the United States has not granted such
recognition to the [Tribe], it and its officials are subject to and must comply with the State
gaming laws in order to conduct such gaming ....
76. . . . [B]ecause the site of the planned casino is not "Indian Country" as defined in federal law
and in [the] IGRA, the Cabazon decision[, which arguably supports the Shinnecock's right under
federal law to construct the casino free from local regulation,] has no application at all.
Id.
131. New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 274 F. Supp. 2d 268, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
77. Therefore, defendants [sic] planned actions to build a casino and conduct gaming cannot be
authorized by IGRA [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701-2721] and,
therefore, are in violation the federal statute [sic].
Id.
132. Id. at 269-70; supra note 82.
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authority to regulate the Shinnecock necessarily required resolution of
whether the Shinnecock ever extinguished aboriginal title to the
Westwoods parcel. In other words, these defenses were necessary
elements to the State's allegation that the Shinnecock violated state and
local law. A court cannot even reach the merits of those claims unless it
first resolves the federal law issues.
In some cases, a federal court might remand or dismiss a case because
the plaintiff alleged a frivolous federal claim in order to endow itself of
the perceived benefits of a federal forum.133 In this regard, the wellpleaded complaint rule acts as scissors (or a sledgehammer) to remove
cases where federal issues may only be subordinate to, or possible
defenses of, state law. In many other cases, federal courts ignore
discussion of the well-pleaded complaint rule because the federal issue
so pervades the case that deciding the merits requires first reaching the
federal issues. 134 In Shinnecock Indian Nation, for example, the district
court never considered the well-pleaded complaint rule in the removal
proceedings, the preliminary injunction proceedings, or the trial
proceedings. It was assumed that the State pleaded a federal question
because of the inescapable issue of whether the Shinnecock could claim
tribal sovereign immunity due to its alleged aboriginal title of
Westwoods.
Assuming the majority opinion was correct to hold that the allegation
of tribal sovereign immunity failed the well-pleaded complaint rule, the
State also expressly alleged that the Shinnecock violated the federal
IGRA statute. 135 Although determining whether the Shinnecock held
aboriginal title resolves both the tribal sovereign immunity and IGRA
issues, IGRA is a completely separate and distinct federal law unrelated
to tribal sovereign immunity.

Indian tribes routinely assert tribal

*
sovereign immunity in a wide variety
of contexts. 136 Sometimes those
assertions are illegitimate, which was possibly the case here.13 7 But,
when a state expressly alleges that an Indian tribe's conduct violates a
federal Indian gaming statute, which directly regulates said conduct and

133. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
134. In Grable, for example, the Supreme Court never mentioned nor discussed the well-pleaded
complaint rule.
135. Supra note 131.
136. See, e.g., M.J. ex rel. Beebe v. United States, 721 F.3d 1079, 1083-85 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that a tribal police officer was immune from tort liability under tribal sovereign immunity);
Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Congress
abrogated tribal sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Code).
137. The dissent, after finding federal question jurisdiction, argued that the Shinnecock had no
basis for tribal sovereign immunity. New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133, 147-56 (2d
Cir. 2012).
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is the subject matter of the suit, it can hardly be said that IGRA is
"simply a restatement" of tribal sovereign immunity.138
B FederalQuestion JurisdictionUnder Grable

Having discussed the well-pleaded complaint rule, this Part examines
whether, under Grable, the complaint alleged a "state-law claim [that]
necessarily raise[d] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally a proved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities."l3
Of the four Grable elements, the majority found that the complaint
met only one-the "disputed" federal issue of whether federal Indian
law precluded the State from exercising its laws over the Shinnecock.14 0
The majority either rejected or failed to discuss the other three elements.
The majority misinterpreted the "necessarily raised" element to mean
that if, under some hypothetical situation, the case could be resolved
without looking to federal law, then the state-law claim does not
necessarily raise a federal issue. 14 1 In other words, in this case, if the
Shinnecock hypothetically submitted for permits, received site plan
approval, and properly completed a host of other things required to build
a casino under state law, a court would not need to determine whether
tribal sovereign immunity or IGRA precluded state regulation. To
support its unique argument, the majority noted that Grable could not be
decided without determining whether the IRS notice complied with
federal law.142 Since the plaintiff "premised" his superior title claim
exclusively on federal law, there was no state content in the complaint
If the majority's
that would support the plaintiffs claim.143
interpretation of Grable holds true, the only way that a federal court
could entertain this action, or any action concerning an Indian tribe's
right to use its land without state interference, would be for the State to
"premise" its complaint only on federal law violations, which it would
never do.
More critically, even if Grable requires a hypothetical test to
determine whether state law could conceivably resolve the claims,
Shinnecock Indian Nation met that test because a court would first need
to conclude that the Shinnecock extinguished its aboriginal title, thereby
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 141 n.4.
Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfr., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).
ShinnecockIndian Nation, 686 F.3d at 139.
Id. at 140-41.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 139-40.
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rendering both IGRA and tribal sovereign immunity inapplicable, before
even reaching the alleged state-law violations. And, if a court found that
the Shinnecock had, in fact, held aboriginal title, whatever state-law
violations existed would necessarily be secondary to federal law under
the IGRA framework and tribal sovereign immunity. For example, in
Gunn, the Supreme Court stated that for the plaintiff to prevail on his
state-law legal malpractice claim, it would "necessarily require
application of patent law" because the plaintiff's lawyer allegedly failed
to make an argument that led to invalidation of his patent.
To
determine the legal malpractice claim, the court would need to do a
"case within a case" analysis of whether, had the argument been made,
the outcome of the earlier litigation would have been different.14 5 In
other words, a court must first conclude that the argument would have
changed the outcome in the patent case, which would have turned on
application of federal law, and if so, then determine the merits of the
state-law claim. Similarly, in Shinnecock Indian Nation, in order for the
State to prevail, it would "necessarily require application" of federal
Indian law to determine extinguishment of aboriginal title prior to
reaching the merits of the state-law claim.
Furthermore, as discussed in Part II.B, the Supreme Court often holds
that controversies involving Indian tribes necessarily turn on federal law
due to their limited sovereignty and, since the founding of the United
States, the federal government's framing of their rights through various
statutes and treaties. For example, in this case, if and how the State can
regulate the Shinnecock's casino activities depends on the interpretation
of IGRA and extinguishment of aboriginal title. While IGRA does not
completely preempt the field of Indian gaming, it does provide a
comprehensive framework that must be referenced whenever an Indian
tribe proposes any sort of tribal gaming. Thus, states have only a
limited ability to regulate tribal gaming and can only go as far as the
federal government allows under IGRA.
Although the majority opinion relied exclusively on the "necessarily
raised" element and considered the "substantiality" and "federal-state
comity" elements not "part of the jurisdictional calculus," 46 given that
Grable incorporated both elements into its test, and Gunn reinforced
them,147 the majority clearly erred in its conclusion.
One could assume that because IGRA so pervades tribal gaming, this
pervasiveness, alone, would satisfy the "substantiality" element of
144. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013).
145. Id.
146. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d at 138.
147. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065 ("Where all four of these requirements are met, we held,
jurisdiction is proper ....").
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Grable. However, despite saturation of federal law in a particular field,
the Supreme Court still looks to the complaint to determine if it arises
under federal law. For example, in Gunn, the Court found that
resolution of the federal patent law issue was not so substantial "to the
federal system as a whole."l48 In essence, the case boiled down to a
state-law legal malpractice claim and while a court would have to
answer a question of patent law, that answer would have no binding
effect outside the individual case. 149 In other words, a state court's
holding in Gunn would have only limited applicability to patent law
generally.
On the other hand, a state court's ruling on aboriginal title and, thus,
an Indian tribe's inability to claim tribal sovereign immunity or to be
regulated under the federal tribal gaming framework, could upset the
federal-state balance that Congress established through treaties and
statutes as well as with IGRA. While patent law geographically extends
much farther to encompass all fifty states, in New York, where tribalstate interactions occur quite frequently, an adverse ruling against the
Shinnecock could potentially have wider impacts even outside the
context of Indian gaming. By foreclosing a federal forum to the
Shinnecock to argue the merits of aboriginal title, the majority in
Shinnecock Indian Nation ensures that all disputes affecting real
property of all Indian tribes in the Second Circuit will be heard by state
courts in a "context of cases in which the states will understandably be
at their most aggressive, seeking to exercise control over how real
property within the boundaries of state borders may be used."o50 While
outside the context of Indian tribes, a state's exercise of its land use laws
is predominantly, if not exclusively, within its review, as discussed
earlier, Indian tribes in "Indian country" or on "Indian land" implicate
rights and activities that a state, in many cases, cannot regulate. Those
rights and activities are framed by federal law and treaties that should
properly be heard in a federal forum.
In Bay Mills, the Sixth Circuit held that whether a casino was located
on Indian land "implicate[d] significant federal issues." 151 Although not
an exact factual match to Shinnecock Indian Nation,lS2 the case involved
what the court characterized as "federal common law," i.e., tribal
sovereign immunity and state-law claims.' 53 The court noted that the
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
sovereign
153.

Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1068.
New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 701 F.3d 101, 102 (2d Cir. 2012).
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406, 413 (6th Cir. 2012).
Bay Mills involved violation of a tribal-state compact under IGRA and the reach of tribal
immunity for off-reservation casinos.
Bay Mills, 695 F.3d at 413.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/6

22

Byers: Federal Question Jurisdiction and Indian Tribes: The Second Circu

2014]

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND INDIAN TRIBES

923

federal issues raised "could have a substantial impact on both the
present litigation and on federal Indian-gaming law more generally" and
that there was "no reason to think Congress would prefer this question to
be resolved by state courts."1 54 Interestingly, the Second Circuit
decided Shinnecock Indian Nation about six weeks prior to Bay Mills.

While there was no indication in either opinion that the courts were
aware of each other's ongoing litigation, it is noteworthy that these two
courts reached such different conclusions.
Despite finding federal question jurisdiction under tribal sovereign
immunity, the court in Bay Mills did not find jurisdiction because of the
alleged violation of IGRA. Its reasoning was couched in terms of
issuing an "advisory opinion," which is a separate justiciability analysis.
However, its tribal sovereign immunity finding could be attacked given
the defense's diminished applicability and various courts' rejection of it
in other contexts.15 5 But, the analysis certainly changes if the issue
involves tribal sovereign immunity in "Indian country" or on "Indian
land," which is generally reservation lands, lands held in trust by the
United States, or aboriginal land. When an Indian tribe raises the
defense in those contexts, federal law and federal treaties determine
whether the land is in fact "Indian country" or "Indian land."
While a state court can quite capably determine whether a particular
property is a reservation or held in trust by the United States by simply
calling the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a dispute involving aboriginal title
often requires scouring and interpreting documents hundreds of years
old-no easy task for either a state or federal court. Regardless of the
difficulties in ascertaining the question of whether land is aboriginal,
when the question is arguable, a state court might fall on the side of the
plaintiff-state. That is not to say that state courts reach the wrong
decision for illegitimate reasons. But, when faced, on the one hand,
with a casino project of the size the Shinnecock proposed, and on the
other, a state and local government attempting to exercise its police
power to regulate land use and protect the interests of its residents, it is
easy to see why a state court might rule against an Indian tribe asserting
the nebulous defense of tribal sovereign immunity. Yet, a court cannot
even reach this defense until it determines the status of the land, which
is informed by federal statutes and treaties. This is the point of both Bay
Mills and the dissent in Shinnecock Indian Nation-there is "no reason

to think Congress would prefer [Indian] questions to be resolved by state
courts" rather than a federal court charged with interpreting and
applying Congress's statutes to specific cases.156
154. Id.
155. See discussion infra Part II.B.
156. Bay Mills, 695 F.3d at 413.
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C. Oneida and Shinnecock
As an initial matter, if Oneida were argued today, it would satisfy the
Grable framework. The Indian tribe necessarily raised a disputed
federal issue-whether the Indian tribe's cessation of land implicated
the Nonintercourse Act giving rise to a present possessory interest. The
issue was substantial as the federal statute required the United States'
consent for any cessation of Indian land. Finally, although the case was
premised as a state-law ejectment action, an Indian tribe's right to
occupancy in its land could "only be interfered with or determined by
the United States," and, thus, resolution in federal court would not
disturb the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.15 7
The majority in Shinnecock Indian Nation read Oneida as support for
the well-pleaded complaint rule. The dissent read Oneida for the
proposition that any land disputes involving Indian tribes properly
belong in federal court simply because they occupy and own the land "in
fee." While the dissent is probably closer to the correct interpretation of
Oneida, it still reads the case too broadly. The reason Shinnecock
Indian Nation implicates Oneida is not because it involved a land
dispute between a state and an Indian tribe. Rather, it implicates Oneida
because that land dispute implicated a federal statute-IGRA-and
federal common law-tribal sovereign immunity-due to the property's
alleged aboriginal title. Because it implicated federal law, it satisfied
the concern of Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Oneida as a
bona fide issue of federal concern and not a "garden-variety" land
dispute. 5 8 If the State's claim in Shinnecock Indian Nation fell outside
IGRA and the issue of aboriginal title, and hence outside federal law, the
claim would fail federal question jurisdiction. For example, if a person
was injured on the Westwoods property, the case could be properly
adjudicated in state court because it would not implicate any important
federal issues. If the claim involved a permitting dispute after
construction commenced, federal law would not apply. Thus, while
Oneida is limited in scope, if the controversy itself involves resolution
of a land dispute that must be informed by federal law, the case controls.
D. Federal Courts vs. State Courts
Although most state courts can competently adjudicate claims
involving aboriginal title, controversies arising under IGRA, or cases
generally affecting Indian land, this alone is not a reason to foreclose the
federal courthouse to Indian tribes. As discussed earlier, the Supreme
157. Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 668 (1974).
158. Id. at 684.
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Court recognized in Oneida the constant tension between states and
Indian tribes. 159 To combat this tension, and to recognize the federal
government's own tension with Indian tribes, Congress has enacted
various laws since the United States' founding to protect Indian tribes
and to give states only limited power to regulate Indian tribes' activities
on Indian land. Once an Indian tribe gives up that protection, whether
through treaties or some other mechanism, or once the federal
government relinquishes its power over the Indian tribe, a state can
regulate as it would any of its other citizens. Until that time, federal
statutes and federal common law severely circumscribe a state's power.
Despite these restrictions, states will continue to find ways to regulate
the conduct of Indian tribes if only to protect its own interests and the
welfare of its non-Indian residents. In Shinnecock Indian Nation, for
example, the district court analyzed expert witness testimony to
conclude that the casino project would have had considerable,
detrimental effects on the environment, traffic, and safety of the
surrounding area. It went so far as to rule that even if the Shinnecock
held aboriginal title to Westwoods, thus supporting the defense of tribal
sovereign immunity, the casino project would still have been barred due
to these negative consequences.
This ruling only underscores the fact
that Indian tribes' activities often directly conflict with the objectives of
the state and local government.
The difficulty for courts is balancing these competing objectives. In
most cases, state courts have proven effective, but historically in Indian
cases, and sometimes, in cases outside that context, state courts will
provide a "home court advantage."l61 The reason to favor federal courts
in Indian law is not because that forum provides some sort of technical
expertise. Instead, the concern relates to the belief that state courts
would naturally favor their constituents' interests because the Indian
tribe's conduct appears "above the law." When an Indian tribe violates
only state law, that claim likely fails federal question jurisdiction. An
Indian tribe can certainly claim tribal sovereign immunity, but unless
federal law regulates the conduct, most courts would find those claims
unavailing. However, when a plaintiff alleges a state-law violation that
necessarily raises a stated federal interest, such as an Indian tribe's claim
of aboriginal title, Supreme Court precedent teaches that this federal
interest is substantial enough in itself to warrant federal question
jurisdiction without upsetting any congressionally approved balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities.

159. Supra note 72.
160. New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F.Supp.2d 185, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
161. Supra note 25.
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IV. CONCLUSION
When the litigation between the State of New York and the
Shinnecock Indian Nation started in 2003, neither party expected that
after nine years of litigation the Second Circuit would remand the case
to state court for failing federal question jurisdiction. When that appeal
crossed the Second Circuit's bench, the two parties expected either an
affirmance or reversal. Given the poor merits of the Shinnecock's tribal
sovereign immunity argument and its blatant disregard of IGRA, it had
no reason to push its case further to the Supreme Court. Although it
would have been interesting for the Court to determine how Grable and
Gunn fit with claims involving Indian tribes and whether the Court
would broaden Oneida's reach, this analysis will have to wait for
another day.162 Thus, like any other party, it seems for the time being
that Indian tribes under the Second Circuit's jurisdiction will be forced
to fight their claims in state court, regardless of whether resolution of
the issue turns on federal Indian law.

162. Although it may not answer how Grable/Gunn informs federal question jurisdiction and
Indian tribes, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve Bay Mills. Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2012), cert.granted,81 U.S.L.W. 3702 (U.S. June 24, 2013)
(No. 12-515).
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